Fideism
The view that religious belief rests on faith rather than reason, and that faith neither requires nor is subject to rational justification.
Definition
The position that faith is the proper basis of religious belief and is independent of, superior to, or even opposed to reason and rational evaluation.
Scope
This topic covers fideist positions, from the radical fideism associated with Kierkegaard's emphasis on the leap of faith and subjective passion, to Wittgensteinian fideism, on which religious language is an autonomous form of life not answerable to external rational standards. It covers the charge that fideism collapses into irrationalism. It does not cover evidentialism or reformed epistemology, treated separately.
Core questions
- Is religious faith something that can or should be rationally justified?
- Does subordinating reason to faith amount to endorsing irrationality?
- Are religious beliefs answerable to standards external to the religious form of life?
- Is some form of fideism implicit in any account of faith?
Key theories
- Kierkegaardian leap of faith
- Kierkegaard argues that the highest religious truth is grasped not through objective reasoning but through a passionate, subjective commitment that embraces objective uncertainty, since faith requires risking belief beyond what reason can establish.
- Wittgensteinian fideism
- On the reading developed from Wittgenstein by Phillips, religious belief belongs to a distinctive language game and form of life with its own internal grammar, so it is a confusion to assess it by the evidential standards of science.
History
Fideist themes run from Tertullian and certain readings of Pascal through the Reformation distrust of natural theology. Kierkegaard gave the position its most influential modern voice in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, interpreters such as Phillips drew on Wittgenstein's later philosophy to develop a fideism that treats religion as an autonomous language game.
Debates
- Whether fideism is a form of irrationalism
- Critics argue that exempting faith from rational scrutiny licenses believing anything and collapses into irrationalism; defenders reply that religious commitment operates by criteria internal to its own practice rather than by no criteria at all.
- Whether religion is an autonomous language game
- Wittgensteinian fideists hold religious discourse is not answerable to external standards; critics charge this insulates belief from legitimate criticism and misreads believers' own truth claims.
Key figures
- Tertullian
- Blaise Pascal
- Søren Kierkegaard
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- D. Z. Phillips
Related topics
Seminal works
- kierkegaard1846
- wittgenstein1966
- phillips1976
Frequently asked questions
- Does fideism mean rejecting reason entirely?
- Not necessarily. Moderate fideism holds that faith does not depend on rational proof while still permitting reasoning within faith; radical fideism makes faith independent of, or even opposed to, reason.
- What is Wittgensteinian fideism?
- It is the view, developed from Wittgenstein's notion of language games, that religious belief is a self-contained form of life with its own internal grammar, so it should not be judged by the evidential standards appropriate to science or everyday factual claims.