Sense and Reference

Frege's distinction between the sense of an expression and its reference resolves how identity statements can be informative and remains foundational for theories of meaning.

Definition

The reference of an expression is the object it designates; its sense is the mode of presentation of that object, the way the reference is given, which two co-referring expressions can differ in.

Scope

This topic covers Frege's sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction and its development. It treats the puzzle of informative identities that motivates positing sense, the extension of the distinction to predicates and whole sentences (whose reference is a truth value and whose sense is a thought), the role of sense as the mode of presentation determining reference, and later debates over whether sense is the right tool for explaining cognitive significance and substitution failures.

Core questions

• Why must we distinguish sense from reference at all?
• What is the sense and reference of a predicate and of a whole sentence?
• Does sense determine reference, and how is sense grasped?
• Can sense explain the cognitive value of identity statements and attitude reports?

Key concepts

• sense (Sinn)
• reference (Bedeutung)
• mode of presentation
• informative identities
• thoughts as sentence senses
• the criterion of difference for senses

Key theories

Frege's sense/reference distinction

Frege argues that 'a = b' can be informative where 'a = a' is not because 'a' and 'b', though co-referring, express different senses; sense is the mode of presentation that also accounts for the meaningfulness of empty terms.

Sense as a cognitive constraint

Evans develops a neo-Fregean account on which sense is governed by an intuitive criterion of difference tied to a thinker's rational sensitivity, grounding sense in the cognitive significance of thoughts rather than mere descriptions.

History

Frege introduced the distinction in his 1892 paper to solve the puzzle of informative identity statements. Dummett's 1973 study made Frege central to analytic philosophy of language, and Evans and McDowell developed a neo-Fregean tradition tying sense to cognitive significance against the rising direct-reference theories.

Debates

Is Fregean sense needed after direct reference?

Whether sense remains indispensable for explaining cognitive significance and attitude contexts, or whether the causal theory of reference and direct-reference semantics show that names contribute only their reference, making sense dispensable for at least some expressions.

Key figures

• Gottlob Frege
• Michael Dummett
• Gareth Evans
• John McDowell

Seminal works

• frege1892
• evans1982

Frequently asked questions

What puzzle does the sense/reference distinction solve?

It explains why an identity statement like 'the morning star is the evening star' is informative while 'the morning star is the morning star' is trivial. Both flanking terms refer to Venus, but they present it via different senses, so only the first conveys new knowledge.