Hobbesian Contractarianism

Hobbesian contractarianism grounds morality in the mutually advantageous agreements that rational, self-interested agents would make to escape the destructive conflict of a state of nature.

Definition

Hobbesian contractarianism holds that moral constraints are the principles it would be rational for self-interested agents to agree to and comply with, because mutual acceptance of such constraints makes everyone better off than they would be under unconstrained pursuit of self-interest.

Scope

This topic covers the contractarian tradition that derives moral and political constraints from rational self-interest: Hobbes's account of the state of nature and the covenant, Gauthier's rational-choice reconstruction of morality as constrained maximization, and the central problems of compliance and the moral standing of those unable to contribute. It contrasts this self-interest-based approach with the moral-impartiality basis of contractualism.

Core questions

• Can morality be derived entirely from rational self-interest?
• Why is it rational to comply with an agreed constraint when defection would pay?
• What is the moral standing of those who cannot benefit or threaten the contractors?
• How does the state of nature establish the baseline for fair agreement?

Key theories

The covenant out of the state of nature

Hobbes's argument that rational agents in a state of nature, where life is a war of all against all, would covenant to authorize a sovereign and accept moral constraints for the sake of peace and self-preservation.

Constrained maximization

Gauthier's thesis that a disposition to comply with mutually advantageous agreements, rather than to maximize utility act by act, is itself the rational disposition for self-interested agents to adopt.

History

Hobbes (1651) gave the foundational statement, deriving political and moral obligation from the rational self-interest of agents seeking to escape the state of nature. Gauthier (1986) reconstructed this project with the tools of rational-choice theory, arguing that constrained maximization is rational, and contemporary contractarians continue to debate compliance and the scope of the moral community.

Debates

The compliance problem and the Foole

Hobbes's Foole and the prisoner's dilemma raise the worry that it is rational to agree to constraints but then defect; Gauthier's reply via constrained maximization is widely contested.

The exclusion of the vulnerable

Because the contract rests on mutual advantage, those unable to benefit or harm the contractors, such as severely disabled people, non-human animals, and future generations, appear to fall outside morality's protection.

Key figures

• Thomas Hobbes
• David Gauthier
• Jan Narveson
• Gilbert Harman

Seminal works

• hobbes1651
• gauthier1986

Frequently asked questions

How does contractarianism differ from contractualism?

Contractarianism grounds morality in the agreements rational self-interested agents would make for mutual advantage, while contractualism grounds it in principles no one could reasonably reject, appealing to a moral concern to justify oneself to others rather than to self-interest.

What is the compliance problem?

It is the difficulty of explaining why a rational self-interested agent should keep an agreement when breaking it would be more advantageous; Gauthier answers that adopting a stable disposition to comply is itself rational.