Skip to contentScholarGate
LibraryBookshelfDeskReview StudioAssistant
Sign in
On this page
IntuitionHow it worksWhen to use itStrengths & limitationsCommon pitfallsApplicationsFrequently asked🔒 Read the full methodSourcesRelated methods
Cite this pageSpotted an issue on this page? Report or suggest a fix →
Home›Psychology›Dictator Game
Hypothesis testEconomic Behavior

Dictator Game

Also known as: Allocation Game, Distribution Task

The Dictator Game is a simple economic decision task measuring generosity and prosocial behavior. One player (dictator) receives money and unilaterally decides how to allocate it between themselves and an anonymous second player (recipient). The recipient cannot reject the offer; they simply receive what the dictator gives. Unlike the Ultimatum Game, the dictator faces no punishment for selfishness. Thus, the Dictator Game reveals baseline generosity without strategic calculation, revealing intrinsic prosocial preferences.

ScholarGate
  1. Hypothesis test
  2. v1
  3. 3 Sources
  4. PUBLISHED
Cite this page →
Tools & resources
Download slides
Learn & explore

Read the full method

Members only

Sign in with a free account to read this section.

Sign in

Method map

The neighbourhood of related methods — select a node to explore.

Dictator Game
Ultimatum Game

When to use it

Use the Dictator Game when measuring intrinsic generosity, prosocial behavior, or moral preferences. It is valuable in exploring how people value fairness independent of strategic concerns, examining cultural differences in generosity, understanding moral development in children, and investigating neural bases of altruism.

Strengths & limitations

Strengths
  • Removes strategic concerns: no punishment threat, so behavior reflects intrinsic preferences rather than calculated responses
  • Simple and transparent: easy to understand and explain, applicable to children and diverse populations
  • Robust cross-culturally: played successfully in diverse societies, enabling cultural comparison of prosocial values
  • Reveals intrinsic preferences: unlike Ultimatum Game, dictator behavior is not confounded with fear of rejection or strategic inference
Limitations
  • Anonymous giving may suppress real generosity: knowing nothing about the recipient, dictators may be less generous than with identifiable others
  • Artificial stakes: small monetary amounts in lab studies may not reflect real-world generosity with significant resources
  • Demand characteristics: knowing they are observed (even anonymously) may inflate giving due to social desirability
  • Dictators may misunderstand task: if dictators believe recipients will know their choices, strategic motives leak back in

Frequently asked

If dictators can keep all the money, why do most give something?

Pure economic self-interest predicts zero giving. Dictators give because they value fairness intrinsically, experience discomfort with extreme inequality, or feel social pressure even in anonymous settings. These motives vary by person and culture, but prosocial preferences appear to be intrinsic, not purely strategic.

Does anonymity suppress dictator giving?

Yes, somewhat. Dictators give more when their allocation is observable and when recipients can identify them. Anonymity reduces giving slightly, suggesting that reputation and empathy partially drive generosity. However, substantial giving persists even with full anonymity, indicating intrinsic prosocial preferences.

How do I know my dictator game results reflect true preferences versus demand characteristics?

Use deception or naturalistic designs: actual monetary stakes where dictators believe payments are real, or studying naturally occurring allocations (e.g., how people divide resources). Compare explicit versus implicit measures of generosity (what people say they would do versus what they actually do).

Can I use the dictator game with children?

Yes, it is frequently used developmentally. Young children (ages 3-5) show less generosity than older children and adults, revealing age-related development of prosocial norms. Adaptation with age-appropriate amounts (stickers, toys) makes the task accessible to young participants.

Sources

  1. Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3), 347-369. DOI: 10.1006/game.1994.1021 ↗
  2. Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press. link ↗
  3. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., et al. (2005). 'Economic man' in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6), 795-855. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X05000142 ↗

How to cite this page

ScholarGate. (2026, June 3). Dictator Game. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/en/psychology/dictator-game

Related methods

Ultimatum Game

Which method?

Set this method beside its closest kin and read them side by side — the library lays the books on the table; the choice is yours.

  • Ultimatum GamePsychology↔ compare
Compare side by side →

Referenced by

Ultimatum Game

Similar methods

Ultimatum GamePublic Goods GameTrust GameMinimal Group ParadigmGeneralized Trust ScaleIowa Gambling TaskVignette ExperimentLost Letter Technique

Related reference concepts

Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational TransfersGame Theory and Bargaining TheoryEquity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and MeasurementMechanism DesignNeuroeconomicsRole and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

Spotted an issue on this page? Report or suggest a fix →

ScholarGate — Dictator Game (Dictator Game). Retrieved 2026-07-21 from https://scholargate.app/en/psychology/dictator-game · Dataset: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026
Quick facts
Originator
Robert Forsythe and colleagues
Subfamily
Economic Behavior
Year
1994
Type
Allocation task
Related methods
Ultimatum Game
ScholarGate

A content-first reference library for research methods — what each one is, how it works, and where it comes from.

Open data (CC-BY)

Explore

  • Library
  • Search the library…
  • Browse by field
  • Fields
  • Journey
  • Compare
  • Which method?

Reference

  • Subjects
  • Atlas
  • Glossary
  • Methodology
  • Philosophy

Your tools

  • Bookshelf
  • Desk
  • Chat

Company

  • About
  • Pricing
  • Contact
  • Suggest a method

Entries are compiled from published sources for reference. Verifying the accuracy and suitability of any information for your own use remains your responsibility.

© 2026 ScholarGate · A research-method reference library
  • Privacy
  • Cookies
  • Terms
  • Delete account