What does 'moral status' mean?

A being has moral status when it matters morally in its own right, so that its interests must be considered in moral deliberation, not merely because of its usefulness to others.

Why is sentience often treated as the key criterion?

Many philosophers argue that the capacity to suffer or enjoy gives a being interests that can be set back or advanced, which is what makes it the kind of thing that can be wronged.

Moral Status of Animals

The moral status of animals concerns whether non-human animals are morally considerable in their own right, and what feature—if any—grounds such status.

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Definition

The question of whether, and on what basis, non-human animals are objects of direct moral concern.

Scope

This topic covers the concept of moral status and moral considerability, candidate grounds for it (sentience, consciousness, having interests, rationality, or being the subject of a life), the question of degrees of moral status, and the implications of marginal cases that complicate drawing the line at species. It describes the competing criteria and arguments rather than asserting which beings count or how much.

Core questions

What gives a being moral status?
Is sentience the relevant criterion, or are consciousness, rationality, or interests required?
Do all beings with moral status have it equally, or are there degrees?
How do 'marginal cases' challenge attempts to restrict moral status by species or capacity?

Key theories

Sentience as the basis of moral status: Following Bentham's question 'Can they suffer?', this view holds that the capacity to experience pleasure and pain is what grounds an interest in not suffering and hence moral considerability.
Mental life and graded status: David DeGrazia argues that careful attention to animal minds supports taking animals seriously as bearers of interests, while leaving open questions about equal versus unequal consideration.

History

Bentham's late-eighteenth-century remark that the morally relevant question is whether animals can suffer is a touchstone of the debate. Twentieth-century philosophers revived and systematized the question, with sentience-based and interest-based criteria becoming central and the 'argument from marginal cases' sharpening the discussion.

Debates

The argument from marginal cases: Critics of species-based status argue that whatever capacity is used to exclude animals (such as rationality) is also lacking in some humans, so consistency requires either including such animals or excluding those humans.

Key figures

Jeremy Bentham
Peter Singer
David DeGrazia

Seminal works

bentham1789
deGrazia1996

Frequently asked questions

What does 'moral status' mean?: A being has moral status when it matters morally in its own right, so that its interests must be considered in moral deliberation, not merely because of its usefulness to others.
Why is sentience often treated as the key criterion?: Many philosophers argue that the capacity to suffer or enjoy gives a being interests that can be set back or advanced, which is what makes it the kind of thing that can be wronged.