Deterrence Modeling
Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict.
Soma mbinu kamili
Ingia kwa akaunti ya bure ili kusoma sehemu hii.
Ramani ya mbinu
Jirani ya mbinu zinazohusiana — chagua nodi ili kuchunguza.
Vyanzo
- Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521781749 ↗
Jinsi ya kunukuu ukurasa huu
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Game-Theoretic Modeling of Deterrence in International Relations. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/sw/international-relations/deterrence-modeling-ir
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- Bargaining Model of WarInternational Relations↔ linganisha
- Crisis Bargaining GameInternational Relations↔ linganisha
- Richardson Arms Race ModelInternational Relations↔ linganisha
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