Crisis Bargaining Game
A crisis bargaining game is a formal, usually extensive-form model in which two states sequentially choose to challenge, escalate, stand firm, or back down during an international dispute, and the analyst solves for the equilibrium pattern of escalation and concession. Building on Schelling's strategy of conflict and given an influential treatment in Fearon's (1994) model of escalation as a war of attrition, these games make explicit how incomplete information about each side's resolve, and the costs each pays for backing down, shape whether a crisis ends in mutual accommodation, capitulation, or war.
Soma mbinu kamili
Ingia kwa akaunti ya bure ili kusoma sehemu hii.
Ramani ya mbinu
Jirani ya mbinu zinazohusiana — chagua nodi ili kuchunguza.
Vyanzo
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592. DOI: 10.2307/2944796 ↗
Jinsi ya kunukuu ukurasa huu
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Game-Theoretic Models of International Crisis Bargaining. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/sw/international-relations/crisis-bargaining-game
Mbinu ipi?
Weka mbinu hii kando ya jamaa zake wa karibu na uzisome bega kwa bega — maktaba huweka vitabu mezani; uamuzi ni wako.
- Audience Cost AnalysisInternational Relations↔ linganisha
- Bargaining Model of WarInternational Relations↔ linganisha
- Deterrence ModelingInternational Relations↔ linganisha
Imerejelewa na
Mbinu zinazofanana
Umeona tatizo kwenye ukurasa huu? Ripoti au pendekeza marekebisho →