Bargaining Model of War
The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement.
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Vyanzo
- Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300033324 ↗
Jinsi ya kunukuu ukurasa huu
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Rationalist Bargaining Model of War (Fearon). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/sw/international-relations/bargaining-model-of-war
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Weka mbinu hii kando ya jamaa zake wa karibu na uzisome bega kwa bega — maktaba huweka vitabu mezani; uamuzi ni wako.
- Audience Cost AnalysisInternational Relations↔ linganisha
- Crisis Bargaining GameInternational Relations↔ linganisha
- Expected Utility Model of WarInternational Relations↔ linganisha
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