Two-Level Game Analysis
Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.
방법 전문 읽기
무료 계정으로 로그인하면 이 섹션을 읽을 수 있습니다.
방법 지도
관련 방법들로 이루어진 인접 영역 — 노드를 선택해 살펴보세요.
출처
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027697 ↗
- Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (1993). Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of California Press. ISBN: 9780520076822
이 페이지 인용 방법
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Two-Level Game Theory (Putnam's International-Domestic Bargaining). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/ko/political-science/two-level-game-analysis
어떤 방법일까요?
이 방법을 가장 가까운 동류의 방법들과 나란히 놓고 비교해 보세요 — 라이브러리는 책을 펼쳐 놓을 뿐, 선택은 여러분의 몫입니다.
- 샤플리 값게임이론↔ 비교
- Spatial Voting ModelPolitical Science↔ 비교
- Veto Player AnalysisPolitical Science↔ 비교
- Voting Power Index AnalysisPolitical Science↔ 비교