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Collective Action Analysis

Collective action analysis explains why rational, self-interested individuals will often fail to act together to secure a common interest, even when every member of the group would benefit from doing so. In his 1965 The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson overturned the prevailing assumption that groups with shared interests would naturally organize to advance them, showing instead that because the fruits of collective action are non-excludable public goods, each member has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others. The problem worsens as the group grows: large, latent groups chronically undersupply their collective good unless they offer selective incentives or coerce participation, while small, privileged groups can succeed. Elinor Ostrom's 1990 Governing the Commons later documented how communities craft durable institutions that solve such dilemmas without the state or privatization, earning her the Nobel Prize.

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출처

  1. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press. ISBN: 9780674537514
  2. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521405997

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ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). The Logic of Collective Action and Group Size. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/ko/political-economy/collective-action-analysis

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ScholarGateCollective Action Analysis (The Logic of Collective Action and Group Size). 2026-06-24에 다음에서 검색함: https://scholargate.app/ko/political-economy/collective-action-analysis · 데이터셋: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026