手法を比較

	部分ゲーム完全均衡	ナッシュ均衡
分野	ゲーム理論	ゲーム理論
系統	Machine learning	Machine learning
提唱年	1965	1950
提唱者	Reinhard Selten	John Nash
種類	algorithm	algorithm
原典	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
別名	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
関連	4	4
概要	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.