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| ランダム効用モデル× | ナッシュ均衡× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | ゲーム理論 | ゲーム理論 |
| 系統 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 提唱年≠ | 1974 | 1950 |
| 提唱者≠ | Daniel McFadden | John Nash |
| 種類 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 原典≠ | McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics (pp. 105-142). Academic Press. link ↗ | Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗ |
| 別名≠ | Discrete Choice Model, Probabilistic Choice, Stochastic Utility | Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair |
| 関連 | 4 | 4 |
| 概要≠ | The Random Utility Model explains discrete choice behavior by assuming agents derive uncertain utilities from alternatives and choose the option yielding highest utility. Introduced by Daniel McFadden in 1974, the model decomposes utility into systematic (observable) and random (idiosyncratic) components, permitting probabilistic choice predictions. The logit model, a parametric specification, yields closed-form choice probabilities that are widely used in marketing, transportation, and environmental valuation. | Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes. |
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