手法を比較

	ナッシュ均衡	部分ゲーム完全均衡
分野	ゲーム理論	ゲーム理論
系統	Machine learning	Machine learning
提唱年	1950	1965
提唱者	John Nash	Reinhard Selten
種類	algorithm	algorithm
原典	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.
別名	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
関連	4	4
概要	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.