Usporedite metode

	Bayesova Nashova ravnoteža	Ravnoteža po Nashu
Područje	Teorija igara	Teorija igara
Obitelj	Machine learning	Machine learning
Godina nastanka	1967	1950
Tvorac	John Harsanyi	John Nash
Vrsta	algorithm	algorithm
Temeljni izvor	Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II, and III. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Drugi nazivi	BNE, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Type-Contingent Equilibrium	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Srodne	4	4
Sažetak	Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) extends Nash Equilibrium to games with incomplete information, where players lack full knowledge of others' payoff functions. Introduced by John Harsanyi in 1967, BNE models strategic interaction under uncertainty by representing unknown payoffs as players' private types drawn from a probability distribution. Equilibrium is found by solving for type-contingent strategies that are best responses to all possible type realizations.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.