Comparer des méthodes

	Modèle Principal-Agent	Valeur de Shapley
Domaine	Théorie des jeux	Théorie des jeux
Famille	Machine learning	Machine learning
Année d'origine	1976	1953
Auteur d'origine	Michael Jensen, William Meckling, Bengt Holmstrom	Lloyd Shapley
Type	algorithm	algorithm
Source fondatrice	Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.
Alias	Agency Theory, Hidden Action Problem, Moral Hazard	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Apparentées	4	4
Résumé	The Principal-Agent Model analyzes how a principal (e.g., owner, employer, policymaker) can incentivize an agent (e.g., manager, employee, firm) to act in the principal's interest when the agent has private information or can take hidden actions. Formalized by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the model identifies agency costs arising from moral hazard (the agent exerts less effort than desired) and adverse selection (the agent hides unfavorable information). Optimal contracts balance incentives with risk allocation.	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.