Selectorate Theory Analysis
Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.
Loe meetodi täielikku kirjeldust
Selle osa lugemiseks logi sisse tasuta kontoga.
Meetodikaart
Seotud meetodite ümbruskond — vali sõlm, et seda uurida.
Allikad
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461 ↗
Kuidas sellele lehele viidata
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/et/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis
Milline meetod?
Aseta see meetod oma lähimate sugulaste kõrvale ja loe neid kõrvuti — raamatukogu laob raamatud lauale; valik on sinu.
- Democratic Peace AnalysisInternational Relations↔ võrdle
- Expected Utility Model of WarInternational Relations↔ võrdle
- Polity Score AnalysisInternational Relations↔ võrdle
Sellele viitavad
Sarnased meetodid
Märkasid sellel lehel viga? Teata sellest või paku parandust →