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Selectorate Theory Analysis

Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.

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Allikad

  1. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461

Kuidas sellele lehele viidata

ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/et/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis

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Sellele viitavad

ScholarGateSelectorate Theory Analysis (Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy). Loetud 2026-06-24 aadressilt https://scholargate.app/et/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis · Andmestik: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026