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MCDMBargaining / game theory

Two-Level Game Analysis

Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.

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  1. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027697
  2. Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (1993). Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of California Press. ISBN: 9780520076822

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ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Two-Level Game Theory (Putnam's International-Domestic Bargaining). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/et/political-science/two-level-game-analysis

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ScholarGateTwo-Level Game Analysis (Two-Level Game Theory (Putnam's International-Domestic Bargaining)). Loetud 2026-06-24 aadressilt https://scholargate.app/et/political-science/two-level-game-analysis · Andmestik: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026