Ontology of Music and Performance

The ontology of music asks what a musical work is and how it relates to its performances, scores, and sound structures.

Definition

The ontology of music concerns the metaphysical category of musical works and their relation to performances and scores; leading proposals identify the work with a pure sound structure, an indicated structure created by the composer, or a kind whose instances are correct performances.

Scope

This topic covers the metaphysics of musical works: whether a work is an eternal sound structure, a created abstract artifact such as an indicated structure, a set of performances, or a fiction; the relation between work and performance and the conditions for a performance to be of a given work; and the historical question of when the work-concept emerged. It does not cover general type/token ontology, treated in a sibling topic, beyond its musical application.

Core questions

• Is a musical work an eternal structure or something the composer creates?
• What relation must a performance bear to a work to be a performance of it?
• Are instrumentation and historical context part of the work's identity?
• Is the very concept of a fixed musical work historically and culturally specific?

Key theories

Works as indicated structures

Levinson argues that a musical work is a sound-structure-as-indicated-by-a-composer-at-a-time, a created abstract entity whose identity includes performance means and historical context, allowing works to be created rather than merely discovered.

The historical work-concept

Goehr argues that the regulative concept of the musical work as a fixed, repeatable, composer-authored object is a historically situated notion that crystallized around 1800, shaping later practice and theory.

History

Analytic ontology of music developed from the general ontology of art, with debate sharpening after Levinson's 1980 'What a Musical Work Is' defended a contextualist, creatable account against Platonist views that treat works as eternal sound structures. Goehr's 1992 history argued the work-concept itself is recent and culturally specific, prompting work on performance, improvisation, and recordings that fit the classical work-concept poorly.

Debates

Platonism vs. creationism about musical works

Whether musical works are eternal sound structures merely discovered by composers (Platonism) or abstract artifacts created by them (creationism) is the central ontological dispute in the philosophy of music.

Fixity and the work-concept

Whether the fixed, score-governed work-concept applies across musical cultures and to jazz, folk, and electronic music, or is parochial to Western classical practice, follows from Goehr's historicizing argument.

Key figures

• Jerrold Levinson
• Lydia Goehr
• Peter Kivy
• Andrew Kania

Seminal works

• levinson1980
• goehr1992

Frequently asked questions

Does a composer create or discover a musical work?

Platonists say the sound structure exists eternally and the composer discovers and indicates it; creationists like Levinson argue the work is an abstract artifact that did not exist before the composer's creative act, partly because we credit composers with creating, not finding, their works.

When did the idea of the musical work arise?

Goehr argues that the regulative concept of a fixed, repeatable, composer-owned work governing performance emerged in European music around 1800, so earlier and non-Western practices may not fit it.