Does Sherlock Holmes exist?

Creationist realists say yes, as an abstract artifact created by Conan Doyle, which is why we can truly say there are famous detectives in fiction; anti-realists like Walton say no, and analyze such talk as moves within a game of make-believe.

What is a game of make-believe in Walton's theory?

It is a rule-governed activity in which props such as novels or paintings prescribe what participants are to imagine; a proposition is fictionally true when the props mandate imagining it, so fiction works by generating prescribed imaginings rather than by describing special objects.

Fictional Objects and Make-Believe

This topic asks what fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes are, and how representational works generate fictional truths through games of make-believe.

Definition

Fictional objects are the entities apparently referred to in and about fiction, such as characters and places; make-believe theory analyzes representational works as props that, by convention, prescribe what their audiences are to imagine as fictionally true.

Scope

This topic covers the ontology and semantics of fiction: whether fictional characters exist and, if so, as nonexistent objects, abstract artifacts, or roles; how representational works prescribe imaginings as props in games of make-believe; and the analysis of statements made within and about fiction. It treats Walton's make-believe theory and the abstract-artifact view of fictional characters. It does not cover the emotional paradox of fiction, treated under interpretation and evaluation.

Core questions

Do fictional characters exist, and if so, what kind of thing are they?
How do works of fiction generate truths about what is the case in the story?
How can we say true things about characters who do not exist?
What is the relation between imagining and fictional truth?

Key theories

Make-believe and props: Walton holds that fictions are props in games of make-believe: by convention they prescribe imaginings, and a proposition is fictional when the prop mandates imagining it, so fictional truth is what one is to imagine.
Fictional characters as abstract artifacts: Thomasson argues that fictional characters are abstract artifacts created by authors' storytelling acts and dependent on texts and a literary practice, which lets us quantify over and refer to them while respecting their createdness.

History

The problem of nonexistent objects, raised by Meinong and Russell, was reframed for fiction in the late twentieth century. Walton's 1990 make-believe theory gave an influential anti-realist account on which there are, strictly, no fictional objects, only prescribed imaginings, while creationist realists such as Thomasson, building on van Inwagen and Kripke, treat characters as abstract artifacts to which we genuinely refer.

Debates

Realism vs. anti-realism about fictional objects: Whether there really are fictional characters—abstract artifacts we can refer to and count—or whether such talk is to be paraphrased away within a pretense, divides creationist realists from Waltonian anti-realists.
Reference and negative existentials: How statements like 'Sherlock Holmes does not exist' can be true if the name refers, and how names function in and outside fiction, is a continuing problem in the philosophy of language.

Key figures

Kendall Walton
Amie Thomasson
Saul Kripke
Peter van Inwagen

Seminal works

walton1990
thomasson1999

Frequently asked questions

Does Sherlock Holmes exist?: Creationist realists say yes, as an abstract artifact created by Conan Doyle, which is why we can truly say there are famous detectives in fiction; anti-realists like Walton say no, and analyze such talk as moves within a game of make-believe.
What is a game of make-believe in Walton's theory?: It is a rule-governed activity in which props such as novels or paintings prescribe what participants are to imagine; a proposition is fictionally true when the props mandate imagining it, so fiction works by generating prescribed imaginings rather than by describing special objects.