Moral Intuitionism

The view that some basic moral truths are self-evident and known non-inferentially.

Definition

Moral intuitionism is the view that some moral propositions are self-evident — adequately understanding them suffices for justified belief — and are known non-inferentially through rational intuition rather than derived from a single master principle.

Scope

This topic covers ethical intuitionism as an epistemology and (often) a metaethics: the claim that there is a plurality of basic moral truths, knowable by rational intuition without proof from anything more basic. It treats Ross's pluralism of prima facie duties, the classical intuitionism of Prichard and Moore, Audi's contemporary fallibilist revival, and the standard objections concerning the nature and reliability of intuition.

Core questions

• What is a moral intuition, and how does it justify belief?
• Can a proposition be self-evident yet not obvious, and known fallibly?
• Are there a plurality of basic duties, or one supreme principle?
• How can intuitionism answer worries that intuitions are unreliable or culturally contingent?

Key concepts

• self-evidence
• prima facie duty
• non-inferential justification
• rational intuition
• defeasibility

Key theories

Pluralistic intuitionism (prima facie duties)

Ross held that we have several irreducible prima facie duties (fidelity, beneficence, non-maleficence, etc.) known by intuition, with actual duty determined by their weighing in the situation.

Fallibilist rational intuitionism

Audi defends self-evident moral truths that can be known non-inferentially while allowing that intuitive justification is defeasible and that adequate understanding may require reflection.

History

Intuitionism dominated early-twentieth-century British ethics through Moore, Prichard (whose 1912 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?' is a landmark), and Ross's 1930 theory of prima facie duties. After mid-century eclipse, it was revived in fallibilist form by Audi and others within the broader non-naturalist resurgence.

Debates

What makes a truth self-evident

Critics complain that 'self-evidence' is obscure or merely names whatever a theorist finds obvious; intuitionists clarify it as justification arising from adequate understanding, compatible with non-obviousness and error.

Reliability of intuitions

Empirical findings that intuitions vary with framing and culture threaten their evidential role; intuitionists restrict the relevant intuitions to considered ones and deny that variation shows unreliability about basic principles.

Key figures

• W. D. Ross
• H. A. Prichard
• Robert Audi

Seminal works

• prichard1912
• ross1930
• audi2004

Frequently asked questions

Does intuitionism mean trusting gut feelings?

No. Philosophical moral intuitionism concerns rational, intellectual apprehension of self-evident propositions on adequate understanding, not emotional hunches; many intuitionists explicitly distinguish intuition from mere feeling.