Moral Epistemology
How, if at all, we can come to know or justifiably believe moral claims.
Definition
Moral epistemology is the branch of metaethics concerned with whether and how moral beliefs can be justified or count as knowledge, including the methods, sources, and structure of moral justification and the threats posed by scepticism.
Scope
This area studies the sources, structure, and limits of moral justification and knowledge. It covers intuitionist accounts that ground basic moral knowledge in self-evident insight, coherentist methods such as reflective equilibrium, the idea of moral perception, and the sceptical challenges that question whether moral knowledge is possible at all. It connects closely to debates about realism, since the prospects for moral knowledge depend partly on what moral facts would be.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- Can moral beliefs amount to knowledge, and if so by what method?
- Are there self-evident or foundational moral truths?
- Is moral justification foundationalist, coherentist, or something else?
- Do disagreement, evolutionary debunking, or the apparent unobservability of moral facts undermine moral knowledge?
Key concepts
- self-evidence
- intuition
- reflective equilibrium
- coherentism
- foundationalism
- debunking arguments
Key theories
- Ethical intuitionism
- Some moral propositions are self-evident and known non-inferentially through rational intuition, providing the foundations of moral knowledge.
- Reflective equilibrium
- Moral justification proceeds by mutually adjusting particular judgements and general principles until they cohere, modelling moral knowledge as coherentist rather than foundationalist.
- Moral scepticism
- Sceptical arguments challenge whether any moral beliefs are justified or constitute knowledge, drawing on disagreement, regress, and debunking considerations.
History
Twentieth-century moral epistemology began with the intuitionism of Moore, Prichard, and Ross, who held that some moral truths are self-evident. Rawls's reflective equilibrium offered an influential coherentist alternative in 1971, and later work by Audi revived a fallibilist intuitionism while sceptics such as Sinnott-Armstrong and proponents of evolutionary debunking pressed the question of whether moral knowledge is possible at all.
Debates
- Foundationalism versus coherentism
- Intuitionists ground moral knowledge in self-evident foundations, while coherentists argue justification arises from the mutual support of judgements and principles; each faces objections about circularity or arbitrary starting points.
- The reliability of moral intuition
- Critics argue intuitions are shaped by culture and evolution and so are unreliable guides to moral truth; defenders distinguish considered intuitions and appeal to their indispensability.
Key figures
- W. D. Ross
- John Rawls
- Robert Audi
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Related topics
Seminal works
- ross1930
- rawls1971
- audi2004
- sinnottarmstrong2006
Frequently asked questions
- How is moral epistemology different from normative ethics?
- Normative ethics asks which acts are right or wrong; moral epistemology asks how we could ever know or be justified in believing such moral claims, whatever the correct normative theory turns out to be.