Moral Perception

The idea that we can perceive moral features of situations much as we perceive ordinary properties.

Definition

Moral perception is the putative capacity to apprehend moral properties of particular situations in a perception-like way — non-inferentially and through attention to the situation — yielding justified moral belief.

Scope

This topic examines the claim that moral knowledge can be perceptual: that a morally sensitive agent literally perceives, or perceptually apprehends, the wrongness of a cruel act or the salience of another's need. It covers the virtue-theoretic version associated with McDowell and Murdoch, Audi's account of moral perception as perception of thick moral properties grounded in non-moral ones, and objections about whether moral properties can figure in genuine perception.

Core questions

• Can moral properties be objects of perception, or only of inference and judgement?
• How does the virtuous person's sensitivity differ from rule-following?
• Is moral perception perception of moral properties themselves, or of grounding non-moral features?
• What epistemic credentials does moral perception confer?

Key concepts

• perceptual sensitivity
• salience
• thick concepts
• non-inferential justification
• attention

Key theories

Virtue-theoretic moral perception

The virtuous agent reliably 'sees' what a situation requires; moral knowledge is a kind of refined perceptual sensitivity to salient features, not the application of codifiable rules.

Audi's account of moral perception

We can perceive thick moral properties (such as a deed's being unjust) by perceiving the non-moral properties on which they are grounded, so moral perception is genuine yet anchored in ordinary perception.

History

The notion has roots in Aristotle's account of the practically wise person's perception of the particular. Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (1970) stressed loving attention to reality, and McDowell's 'Virtue and Reason' (1979) developed perception-based virtue ethics; Audi's Moral Perception (2013) gave a systematic contemporary defence.

Debates

Whether moral properties are perceptible

Critics argue perception delivers only natural, sensible properties, so any moral content must be inferred or judged; defenders argue perception can be theory- and concept-laden and present thick moral features.

Codifiability of the moral

McDowell's view that moral knowledge resists codification into rules is contested by those who think moral competence must rest on general principles.

Key figures

• John McDowell
• Iris Murdoch
• Robert Audi

Seminal works

• murdoch1970
• mcdowell1979
• audi2013

Frequently asked questions

Is moral perception the same as moral intuition?

They are related but distinct. Intuition is typically construed as intellectual apprehension of general self-evident truths, while moral perception concerns apprehension of the moral features of particular concrete situations, often through attention and sensitivity.