Moral Cognitivism

The view that moral judgements express beliefs and are capable of being true or false.

Definition

Moral cognitivism is the view that moral judgements are beliefs that represent the world as being a certain (moral) way, and so are truth-apt — they can be correct or incorrect.

Scope

This topic covers cognitivism, the semantic and psychological thesis that moral utterances express genuine beliefs with truth-conditions. It examines the arguments for cognitivism from moral phenomenology and the surface grammar of moral discourse, its compatibility with both realism and antirealism (e.g. error theory is a cognitivist antirealism), and the objections it faces from the moral judgement-motivation link.

Core questions

• Why think moral judgements are beliefs rather than attitudes?
• Does the truth-aptness of moral sentences settle whether moral facts exist?
• How does cognitivism explain the connection between moral judgement and motivation?
• Can a cognitivist also be an antirealist?

Key concepts

• truth-aptness
• belief
• representation
• the moral problem
• minimalism about truth

Key theories

Descriptivist cognitivism

Moral predicates ascribe properties and moral sentences state truth-evaluable propositions, supported by the smooth way moral claims embed in logical contexts and feature in reasoning.

Cognitivism and the moral problem

Smith frames cognitivism as one horn of a trilemma with the practicality of moral judgement and the Humean theory of motivation, motivating a cognitivist account that nonetheless explains moral motivation.

History

Cognitivism was the default assumption of pre-twentieth-century ethics and of Moore's intuitionism. It was challenged by emotivism and prescriptivism, then defended in sophisticated forms by writers such as Smith, who sought to reconcile the belief-like and motivating aspects of moral judgement within a broadly cognitivist framework.

Debates

Cognitivism and motivation

If moral judgements are beliefs, and beliefs alone do not motivate (Humean theory), cognitivism seems unable to explain why moral judgement reliably moves us to act; this is a central pressure on the view.

Whether truth-aptness requires realism

Minimalists argue that moral sentences can be truth-apt without rich moral facts, so cognitivism does not by itself entail moral realism.

Key figures

• G. E. Moore
• Michael Smith
• Mark van Roojen

Seminal works

• moore1903
• smith1994

Frequently asked questions

Does being a cognitivist commit you to objective moral facts?

No. Cognitivism only says moral judgements are truth-apt beliefs. An error theorist is a cognitivist who thinks those beliefs are all false, and minimalists about truth can be cognitivists without robust moral facts.