Emotivism and Prescriptivism

The classical non-cognitivist theories: moral talk as expression of emotion, and moral talk as universalizable prescription.

Definition

Emotivism is the non-cognitivist view that moral utterances express the speaker's emotions and seek to influence others' attitudes; prescriptivism is the non-cognitivist view that moral judgements are universalizable prescriptions, akin to imperatives that the speaker is committed to applying to all relevantly similar cases.

Scope

This topic covers the two foundational mid-century forms of non-cognitivism. Emotivism, arising from logical positivism, holds that moral sentences express and arouse feelings rather than state facts. Prescriptivism, developed by R. M. Hare, holds that moral judgements are universalizable prescriptions governed by logical constraints. The topic traces their motivations, their treatment of moral reasoning, and the objections that led to their refinement into contemporary expressivism.

Core questions

• Do moral sentences state anything truth-evaluable, or only express and evoke attitudes?
• How can emotivism distinguish moral disagreement from mere clashes of feeling?
• What logical constraints, such as universalizability, govern moral prescriptions?
• Can prescriptivism explain moral reasoning better than emotivism?

Key concepts

• emotive meaning
• verification principle
• prescriptivity
• universalizability
• supervenience of the moral

Key theories

Emotivism

Moral judgements lack factual content; they express the speaker's approval or disapproval and function to influence the attitudes of others ('boo'/'hurrah').

Universal prescriptivism

Moral judgements are prescriptions that are universalizable: in calling something wrong one prescribes against it and commits to the same verdict in all relevantly similar cases, supplying a logic for moral argument.

History

Emotivism grew out of the logical positivist verification principle in the 1930s, given canonical statement by Ayer (1936) and elaborated by Stevenson (1944). Dissatisfaction with its handling of moral reasoning prompted Hare's prescriptivism in The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963), which sought to give non-cognitivism a rational structure.

Debates

Moral disagreement under emotivism

If moral claims merely express feelings, it is hard to see how parties genuinely disagree rather than simply have opposed attitudes; Stevenson distinguished disagreement in belief from disagreement in attitude in reply.

Whether prescriptivism collapses into relativism

Critics charged that Hare's framework permits any consistent universalizable prescription, including fanatical ones; Hare's later work tried to constrain admissible moral judgements through universalizability and impartial preference.

Key figures

• A. J. Ayer
• Charles Stevenson
• R. M. Hare

Seminal works

• ayer1936
• stevenson1944
• hare1952
• hare1963

Frequently asked questions

Why is emotivism nicknamed the 'boo-hurrah theory'?

Because on the emotivist view, saying 'stealing is wrong' is functionally like saying 'stealing — boo!' and 'charity is good' like 'charity — hurrah!': it expresses an attitude rather than stating a fact.