Judgment Internalism and Externalism

Whether sincerely judging an act right necessarily brings some motivation to perform it.

Definition

Judgment internalism is the thesis that it is necessarily true that an agent who sincerely judges an action to be right is thereby motivated, at least defeasibly, to perform it; judgment externalism denies any such necessary connection, holding that the link between moral judgement and motivation is contingent.

Scope

This topic covers the dispute over motivational (judgement) internalism: the thesis that there is a necessary, conceptual link between a sincere moral judgement and motivation. It examines strong and weak (defeasible) versions of internalism, the externalist alternative that the link is contingent and explained by an external desire to be moral, and the test case of the amoralist who appears to judge without being moved.

Core questions

• Is the connection between moral judgement and motivation necessary or contingent?
• Should internalism be strong (motivation guaranteed) or weak (defeasible, holding in the practically rational)?
• Is the amoralist a genuine counterexample to internalism?
• How does the internalism debate bear on cognitivism and the Humean theory?

Key concepts

• motivational internalism
• the amoralist
• defeasibility
• weakness of will
• practical rationality

Key theories

Defeasible judgement internalism

A sincere moral judgement necessarily motivates absent practical irrationality, so internalism holds for the practically rational agent without being refuted by weakness of will.

Motivational externalism

Moral judgement is belief and does not by itself motivate; the reliable connection to action is explained by a contingent standing desire to do what is right, defended partly through the conceivability of the amoralist.

History

The internalism question, latent in Hume and Kant, became a focus of late-twentieth-century metaethics. Brink (1989) pressed the externalist amoralist challenge, Smith (1994) defended a defeasible internalism within his diagnosis of the moral problem, and Svavarsdóttir (1999) mounted an influential empirically informed externalist case.

Debates

The amoralist challenge

Externalists argue we can coherently describe someone who makes moral judgements yet feels no corresponding motivation; internalists reply that such a person uses moral words only in an inverted-commas sense.

Strong versus weak internalism

Strong internalism is refuted by depression and weakness of will, so defenders retreat to a defeasible version restricted to rational agents; critics ask whether the qualified thesis still does substantive work.

Key figures

• Michael Smith
• David Brink
• Sigrún Svavarsdóttir

Seminal works

• brink1989
• smith1994
• svavarsdottir1999

Frequently asked questions

What is the 'inverted commas' reply?

Internalists explain apparent amoralists by saying they use moral terms in inverted commas — applying labels others use, without making the judgement in the full sense. So they do not really judge an act wrong while remaining wholly unmoved.