Moral Antirealism and Error Theory

The denial of objective moral facts, and the error theorist's claim that ordinary moral judgements are therefore systematically untrue.

Definition

The moral error theory holds that moral judgements are genuine assertions that presuppose the existence of objective, categorically prescriptive moral facts, but that no such facts exist, so all positive, atomic moral judgements are false.

Scope

This topic covers antirealist positions that reject mind-independent moral facts, with a focus on the moral error theory: the cognitivist-but-sceptical view that moral claims aim at the truth yet uniformly fail because the objective values they presuppose do not exist. It surveys the arguments from queerness and disagreement that motivate error theory, and the 'now what?' question of how to go on once one accepts it (abolitionism, fictionalism, conservationism).

Core questions

• Does ordinary moral discourse really presuppose objective, categorical values?
• Are the arguments from queerness and disagreement strong enough to establish that no moral facts exist?
• If error theory is true, should we abolish, revise, or keep using moral language?
• How does error theory differ from non-cognitivist forms of antirealism?

Key concepts

• categorical prescriptivity
• argument from queerness
• abolitionism
• fictionalism
• moral nihilism

Key theories

Mackie's error theory

Moral claims assert the existence of objective prescriptive values, but such values would be metaphysically and epistemologically queer and there is no good reason to believe in them, so ordinary moral claims are in error.

Moral fictionalism

Granting that moral claims are strictly false, we may nonetheless retain moral discourse as a useful fiction, making moral assertions in a non-asserting, make-believe mode.

History

Although nihilist strands appear earlier, the modern error theory is fixed by Mackie's 1977 account of morality as a useful invention resting on a false presupposition of objective values. Joyce (2001) sharpened the conceptual claim about categorical prescriptivity and developed fictionalism, and Olson (2014) offered a systematic historical and analytic defence.

Debates

Whether moral discourse presupposes objectivity

Error theory depends on the claim that ordinary moral judgements are committed to objective, categorical values; opponents argue that everyday moral talk carries no such metaphysical baggage.

What to do after error theory

Accepting error theory raises the practical question of whether to abandon moral talk (abolitionism), keep it as a fiction (fictionalism), or retain it pragmatically (conservationism).

Key figures

• J. L. Mackie
• Richard Joyce
• Jonas Olson

Seminal works

• mackie1977
• joyce2001
• olson2014

Frequently asked questions

Is error theory a kind of relativism?

No. Relativism says moral claims are true relative to a framework; error theory says moral claims aim at objective truth and fail, so they are simply false rather than true-relative-to-something.