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MCDMGame-theoretic / formal political economy of IR

Selectorate Theory Analysis

Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.

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Kilder

  1. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461

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ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/da/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis

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Refereret af

ScholarGateSelectorate Theory Analysis (Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy). Hentet 2026-06-24 fra https://scholargate.app/da/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis · Datasæt: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026