Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts
Austin distinguished the act performed in saying something (illocutionary) from the effects achieved by saying it (perlocutionary), alongside the locutionary act of saying it.
Definition
The illocutionary act is the act performed in uttering a sentence with a certain conventional force; the perlocutionary act is the act of producing effects on the hearer by means of the utterance.
Scope
This topic covers Austin's three-way analysis of every utterance: the locutionary act (producing a meaningful sentence), the illocutionary act (what one does in saying it, such as warning or promising), and the perlocutionary act (the effects produced on the hearer, such as persuading or alarming). It treats the central notion of illocutionary force, the difference between conventional illocutionary effects and contingent perlocutionary ones, and how force is signalled.
Core questions
- What is the difference between an illocutionary and a perlocutionary act?
- What is illocutionary force, and how is it conveyed?
- Why are perlocutionary effects not conventional in the way illocutionary acts are?
- How does the locutionary act relate to the illocutionary act?
Key concepts
- locutionary act
- illocutionary act
- perlocutionary act
- illocutionary force
- uptake
- conventional vs. causal effect
Key theories
- Locution-illocution-perlocution trichotomy (Austin)
- Every utterance involves a locutionary act of saying something meaningful, an illocutionary act of doing something in saying it, and a perlocutionary act of producing effects by saying it.
- Illocutionary force and uptake
- Illocutionary acts succeed through conventional means and require hearer uptake of the intended force, distinguishing them from the merely causal effects characteristic of perlocution.
History
Austin introduced the locution-illocution-perlocution distinction in the later lectures of How to Do Things with Words to replace the failing performative-constative dichotomy. Searle and others refined the notion of illocutionary force, and the distinction between conventional illocutionary effects and contingent perlocutionary ones became foundational to pragmatic theory.
Debates
- Are illocutionary acts conventional or intention-based?
- Whether the force of an illocutionary act is secured by social convention (Austin) or by the speaker's communicative intention recognized by the hearer (a more Gricean construal).
Key figures
- J. L. Austin
- John Searle
- Stephen Levinson
Related topics
Seminal works
- austin1962
- searle1969
Frequently asked questions
- What is an example of the illocution-perlocution difference?
- Uttering 'Watch out!' to perform the illocutionary act of warning is distinct from the perlocutionary act of frightening or making the hearer jump; the warning is the act done in speaking, while the fright is an effect produced by it.