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MCDMGame-theoretic / formal political economy of IR

Selectorate Theory Analysis

Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.

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来源

  1. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461

如何引用本页

ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/zh/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis

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被引用于

ScholarGateSelectorate Theory Analysis (Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy). 于 2026-06-24 检索自 https://scholargate.app/zh/international-relations/selectorate-theory-analysis · 数据集: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026