方法证据记录
Stackelberg Competition
Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.
源记录
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Stackelberg Oligopoly Model with Leader-Follower Dynamics
分类方法记录 · ml-model / game-theory
- von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. · URL
- Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press. · URL
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