方法对比
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| 子博弈完美均衡× | 纳什均衡× | |
|---|---|---|
| 领域 | 博弈论 | 博弈论 |
| 方法族 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 起源年份≠ | 1965 | 1950 |
| 提出者≠ | Reinhard Selten | John Nash |
| 类型 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 开创性文献≠ | Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗ | Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗ |
| 别名≠ | Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium | Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair |
| 相关 | 4 | 4 |
| 摘要≠ | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games. | Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes. |
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