Median Voter Model
The median voter model is a foundational result of political economy stating that, under majority rule with voters whose preferences are single-peaked on a single policy dimension, the ideal point of the median voter is the Condorcet winner — it cannot be beaten by any other alternative in pairwise majority voting. Duncan Black established the theorem formally in 1948, and Anthony Downs extended it in 1957 into a theory of party competition in which two vote-maximizing parties converge to the median voter's preferred policy. The model is the workhorse linking the distribution of citizen preferences to equilibrium policy outcomes in democracies.
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Vyanzo
- Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. DOI: 10.1086/256633 ↗
- Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. ISBN: 9780060417505
Jinsi ya kunukuu ukurasa huu
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Median Voter Theorem and Model of Electoral Competition. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/sw/political-economy/median-voter-model
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