The Paradox of Fiction

How can we be genuinely moved by characters and events we know to be merely fictional? The paradox of fiction asks how our emotional responses to fiction can be rational.

Definition

The paradox of fiction is the puzzle that three individually plausible claims appear jointly inconsistent: that we are genuinely moved by fictions, that being so moved requires believing the relevant objects and events exist, and that we do not believe fictional objects exist.

Scope

This topic covers the paradox of emotional response to fiction: the apparent inconsistency among the claims that we have genuine emotions toward fictional objects, that emotions require belief in the existence of their objects, and that we do not believe fictional objects exist. It treats the leading responses—pretend-emotion (quasi-emotion) theory, thought theory, and the rejection of the existence-belief requirement. It does not cover the ontology of fiction or make-believe in general, treated under that topic.

Core questions

• Are our emotional responses to fiction genuine emotions?
• Does emotion toward an object require believing it exists?
• Which of the paradox's premises should be rejected?
• Is being moved by fiction irrational?

Key theories

The paradox stated (Radford)

Radford presses the puzzle that we appear to be genuinely moved by characters we know to be fictional, and concludes that such responses are in some way inconsistent or irrational, since they lack the beliefs emotions seem to require.

Quasi-emotions and make-believe (Walton)

Walton argues that we do not literally fear or pity fictional characters; rather, within a game of make-believe it is fictional that we fear them, and we feel quasi-emotions—genuine sensations embedded in pretense.

Thought theory

Thought theorists hold that emotions can be caused by entertaining thoughts or mental representations without believing their objects exist, so responses to fiction are genuine emotions that simply do not require existence beliefs.

History

Radford's 1975 paper 'How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?' posed the paradox in its modern form, and Walton's 1978 'Fearing Fictions' offered the influential make-believe response that our responses are quasi-emotions within pretense. Subsequent decades produced thought theories, which deny that emotion requires existence belief, and detailed work on imagination, simulation, and the genuineness of fiction-directed emotions.

Debates

Are fiction-directed emotions genuine?

Walton's quasi-emotion view denies that we literally feel emotions toward fictional characters, while thought theorists insist the emotions are genuine and merely lack the existence beliefs the paradox assumes.

Which premise to reject

Responses differ over whether to deny that the responses are genuine emotions, that emotions require existence beliefs, or that we lack the relevant beliefs, with most contemporary work rejecting the belief requirement.

Key figures

• Colin Radford
• Kendall Walton
• Gregory Currie
• Noël Carroll

Seminal works

• radford1975
• walton1978

Frequently asked questions

What exactly is paradoxical about being moved by fiction?

It seems we genuinely feel pity or fear for fictional characters; yet emotions appear to require believing their objects are real; yet we know the characters are not real. The three claims cannot all be true, so at least one must be given up.

How does Walton resolve the paradox?

Walton denies that we literally have emotions toward fictional characters; within a game of make-believe it is fictionally true that we do, and we experience real felt sensations he calls quasi-emotions, so no genuine emotion toward a known-unreal object is required.