Cognitivism and Expressivism
What moral judgements are: beliefs that can be true or false, or expressions of non-cognitive attitudes such as approval and disapproval.
Definition
Cognitivism is the view that moral judgements express truth-apt beliefs about moral facts; expressivism (a form of non-cognitivism) is the view that moral judgements primarily express non-cognitive, attitude-like states rather than describe how things are.
Scope
This area addresses the semantics and psychology of moral judgement. Cognitivism holds that moral sentences express beliefs and are truth-apt; non-cognitivism, in its emotivist, prescriptivist, and contemporary expressivist forms, holds that moral judgements primarily express desire-like attitudes. It covers the development from early emotivism through Hare's prescriptivism to Gibbard's and Blackburn's sophisticated expressivism, and the central technical challenge — the Frege-Geach problem — that any non-cognitivism must solve.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- Do moral sentences express beliefs or non-cognitive attitudes?
- Are moral judgements capable of being true or false?
- How can non-cognitivism account for the logic of moral reasoning?
- What explains the apparently tight connection between moral judgement and motivation?
Key concepts
- truth-aptness
- cognitive vs. non-cognitive states
- emotive meaning
- universalizability
- norm-expressivism
Key theories
- Emotivism
- Moral statements do not state facts but express the speaker's emotions and seek to influence others' attitudes; 'X is wrong' functions like an expression of disapproval.
- Prescriptivism
- Moral judgements are a species of prescription or universalizable imperative; to call an act wrong is, in part, to prescribe that it not be done.
- Contemporary expressivism
- Refined non-cognitivism (norm-expressivism and quasi-realism) holds that moral judgements express states of norm-acceptance or planning while accommodating moral truth-talk and the logic of moral language.
History
Non-cognitivism arose with logical positivism: Ayer's 1936 emotivism treated moral claims as meaningless-as-factual expressions of feeling, refined by Stevenson and then by Hare's prescriptivism. From the 1980s, Blackburn's quasi-realism and Gibbard's norm-expressivism transformed non-cognitivism into a sophisticated program able to mimic the trappings of cognitivist moral discourse.
Debates
- Cognitivism versus non-cognitivism
- The core dispute is whether moral judgements are beliefs apt for truth or expressions of attitudes; each side appeals to features of moral phenomenology, semantics, and the judgement-motivation link.
- Whether expressivism can capture moral logic
- Expressivists must explain valid moral inference and the constancy of moral meaning across embedded contexts without appealing to truth-conditions, the heart of the Frege-Geach challenge.
Key figures
- A. J. Ayer
- Charles Stevenson
- R. M. Hare
- Allan Gibbard
- Simon Blackburn
Related topics
Seminal works
- ayer1936
- stevenson1944
- hare1952
- gibbard1990
Frequently asked questions
- Is non-cognitivism the same as moral relativism?
- No. Non-cognitivism is a claim about what moral judgements are (expressions of attitude rather than belief); relativism is a claim about the truth-conditions of moral statements. One can hold either without the other.