Fictional and Nonexistent Objects

We seem to talk and reason about things that do not exist, such as Sherlock Holmes, the golden mountain, and the round square. This topic asks what, if anything, we are talking about and how such discourse can be meaningful or true.

Definition

A nonexistent object is an entity that is referred to or reasoned about but does not exist; fictional objects are a salient subclass introduced by works of fiction.

Scope

Covers Meinong's theory of objects and nonexistent items, Russell's eliminativist theory of descriptions, abstract-artifact theories of fictional characters, and the semantics of negative existentials and discourse about fiction.

Core questions

• Are there objects that do not exist?
• What do names from fiction refer to, if anything?
• How can sentences about fictional characters be true?
• Should nonexistent objects be eliminated by paraphrase or admitted into ontology?

Key concepts

• Nonexistent object
• Negative existential
• Theory of descriptions
• Abstract artifact
• Reference and fiction

Key theories

Meinongian object theory

Every thought has an object, and some objects, such as the golden mountain, do not exist yet still have properties and can be the subject of true claims; being is broader than existence.

Russellian theory of descriptions

Apparent reference to nonexistents is analyzed away: 'the golden mountain does not exist' is rendered as a quantified claim with no commitment to a nonexistent object.

Fictional objects as abstract artifacts

Fictional characters are abstract entities created by authors and existing as cultural artifacts, allowing literally true claims such as 'Holmes was created by Conan Doyle'.

History

Meinong's theory of objects provoked Russell's 1905 theory of descriptions, designed to dispense with nonexistent objects. Later neo-Meinongians such as Parsons revived object theory, while creationist and artifactualist accounts treated fictional entities as authored abstract objects.

Debates

Do nonexistent objects belong in our ontology?

Meinongians admit a domain of objects beyond what exists; Russellians and many contemporary philosophers reject this, paraphrasing apparent reference away or treating fictional objects as abstracta.

Key figures

• Alexius Meinong
• Bertrand Russell
• Peter van Inwagen
• Terence Parsons
• Amie Thomasson

Seminal works

• meinong1904
• russell1905
• vanInwagen1977

Frequently asked questions

If Sherlock Holmes does not exist, how can it be true that he is a detective?

Theories differ. Meinongians say Holmes is a nonexistent object that has the property of being a detective; artifactualists treat Holmes as an abstract artifact, with claims true relative to the fiction; Russellians paraphrase such talk in terms that avoid reference to him.