Veto Player Analysis
Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.
Leia o método completo
Entre com uma conta gratuita para ler esta seção.
Mapa de métodos
A vizinhança de métodos relacionados — selecione um nó para explorar.
+4 mais
Fontes
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
- Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007225 ↗
Como citar esta página
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Veto Player Theory and Analysis. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/pt/political-science/veto-player-analysis
Qual método?
Coloque este método ao lado dos seus pares mais próximos e leia-os lado a lado — a biblioteca dispõe os livros sobre a mesa; a escolha é sua.
- Ideal Point EstimationPolitical Science↔ comparar
- Spatial Voting ModelPolitical Science↔ comparar
- Two-Level Game AnalysisPolitical Science↔ comparar
- Voting Power Index AnalysisPolitical Science↔ comparar
Referenciado por
Métodos semelhantes
Encontrou um problema nesta página? Relate ou sugira uma correção →