ScholarGate
Asystent

Anomalous Monism and Non-Reductive Physicalism

Non-reductive physicalism holds that the mental is physical at the level of events but not reducible to it; anomalous monism is its best-known version.

Znajdź temat z PaperMindWkrótceFind papers & topics
Tools & resources
Pobierz slajdy
Learn & explore
WideoWkrótce

Definition

Anomalous monism is the view that every mental event is identical to some physical event, yet there are no strict psychophysical laws; non-reductive physicalism more generally combines the physical nature of the mental with a denial of its reducibility.

Scope

This topic covers Davidson's anomalous monism, the broader family of non-reductive physicalist views grounded in supervenience and multiple realizability, the autonomy of the special sciences, and the central worry that such views render the mental epiphenomenal.

Core questions

  • Can every mental event be physical while the mental remains irreducible?
  • Why should there be no strict laws connecting the mental and the physical?
  • Do the special sciences enjoy autonomy from physics?
  • Does non-reductive physicalism render mental properties epiphenomenal?

Key concepts

  • token identity
  • psychophysical anomalism
  • supervenience
  • multiple realizability
  • special sciences
  • epiphenomenalism

Key theories

Anomalous monism
Mental events are token-identical to physical events, but because mental description is governed by norms of rationality there are no strict psychophysical laws.
Autonomy of the special sciences
Higher-level sciences traffic in multiply realizable kinds that need not reduce to physics, supporting a non-reductive picture of the mental.

History

Davidson (1970) introduced anomalous monism by combining token physicalism with the denial of strict psychophysical laws, while Fodor (1974) defended the autonomy of the special sciences via multiple realizability. Kim (1993, 1998) pressed both with the charge that, without reduction, the mental risks epiphenomenalism.

Debates

Epiphenomenalism worry
Whether anomalous monism leaves mental properties causally idle because events cause only in virtue of their physical descriptions.
Reducibility of the special sciences
Whether multiple realizability really blocks reduction of higher-level sciences to physics.

Key figures

  • Donald Davidson
  • Jerry Fodor
  • Jaegwon Kim

Related topics

Seminal works

  • davidson1970
  • fodor1974
  • kim1998

Frequently asked questions

Why is it called 'anomalous' monism?
'Monism' because there is one kind of event, the physical; 'anomalous' because Davidson holds there are no strict laws, no nomos, connecting mental and physical descriptions of those events.

Methods for this concept

Related concepts