ScholarGate
Assistent
MCDMCooperative game theory / coalition theory

Coalition Formation Analysis

Coalition formation analysis is the formal study of which subset of parties will combine to form a governing or decision-making coalition when no single party commands a majority. William Riker's 1962 The Theory of Political Coalitions supplied the foundational logic: under pure office-seeking, rational politicians form minimal winning coalitions and, by the size principle, the smallest winning coalition possible, so that the spoils of office are divided among as few partners as necessary. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield's 1990 Multiparty Government enriched this with policy-seeking motives, showing that coalitions also tend to be ideologically connected. The framework predicts coalition membership from seat shares and party positions.

Åpne i MethodMindSnartBruk, sammenlign, få veiledning
Verktøy og ressurser
Last ned lysbilder
Lær og utforsk
VideoSnart

Les hele metoden

Kun for medlemmer

Logg inn med en gratis konto for å lese denne delen.

Logg inn

Metodekart

Nabolaget av beslektede metoder — velg en node for å utforske.

Kilder

  1. Riker, W. H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press. ISBN: 9780300001754
  2. Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1990). Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780198280798

Slik siterer du denne siden

ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Coalition Formation Analysis in Multiparty Systems. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/no/political-economy/coalition-formation-analysis

Hvilken metode?

Sett denne metoden ved siden av sin nærmeste slektning og les dem side om side — biblioteket legger bøkene på bordet; valget er ditt.

Sammenlign side om side

Referert av

ScholarGateCoalition Formation Analysis (Coalition Formation Analysis in Multiparty Systems). Hentet 2026-06-24 fra https://scholargate.app/no/political-economy/coalition-formation-analysis · Datasett: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026