방법 비교
선택한 방법을 나란히 검토하세요. 서로 다른 행은 강조 표시됩니다.
| Top Trading Cycles× | 주인-대리인 모형× | |
|---|---|---|
| 분야 | 게임이론 | 게임이론 |
| 계열 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 기원 연도≠ | 1974 | 1976 |
| 창시자≠ | Lloyd Shapley, Herbert Scarf | Michael Jensen, William Meckling, Bengt Holmstrom |
| 유형 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 원전≠ | Shapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 23-37. DOI ↗ | Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. DOI ↗ |
| 별칭 | TTC, Shapley-Scarf Algorithm, Efficient Exchange | Agency Theory, Hidden Action Problem, Moral Hazard |
| 관련 | 4 | 4 |
| 요약≠ | Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is an algorithm for allocating indivisible goods to agents such that the allocation is Pareto efficient and individually rational. Developed by Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf in 1974, the algorithm identifies cycles of trades in a preference digraph, executes those trades, and iteratively repeats until no further trades are beneficial. TTC is widely used in kidney exchange and housing allocation due to its efficiency and implementation simplicity. | The Principal-Agent Model analyzes how a principal (e.g., owner, employer, policymaker) can incentivize an agent (e.g., manager, employee, firm) to act in the principal's interest when the agent has private information or can take hidden actions. Formalized by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the model identifies agency costs arising from moral hazard (the agent exerts less effort than desired) and adverse selection (the agent hides unfavorable information). Optimal contracts balance incentives with risk allocation. |
| ScholarGate데이터셋 ↗ |
|
|