방법 비교

	Public Goods Game	Social Relations Model
분야	사회심리학	사회심리학
계열	Process / pipeline	Regression model
기원 연도	2000	2006
창시자	Experimental economics tradition; Fehr & Gachter (cooperation and punishment)	David A. Kenny and colleagues
유형	Multi-player social-dilemma paradigm	Variance-decomposition model for dyadic data
원전	Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.	Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Cook, W. L. (2006). Dyadic Data Analysis. Guilford Press. ISBN: 9781572309869
별칭	Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Common-Pool Contribution Game, Linear Public Goods Game	SRM, Kenny Social Relations Model, Round-Robin Variance Partition
관련	3	3
요약	The public goods game is the canonical multi-person social dilemma used to study cooperation. Each member of a group is endowed with money and simultaneously decides how much to keep privately and how much to contribute to a common pool; the pool is multiplied and split equally among all members regardless of contribution. Because the marginal per-capita return is less than one but the group return exceeds one, every individual is privately better off free-riding while the group is collectively better off if all contribute -- the defining tension of a social dilemma. Experiments consistently show people contribute well above the self-interested zero, but contributions decay over repeated rounds unless institutions intervene. Fehr and Gachter's influential demonstration that allowing players to pay to punish free-riders restores and sustains high cooperation made the paradigm central to research on norms, altruistic punishment, and collective action.	The Social Relations Model (SRM), developed by David Kenny and colleagues, is a variance-decomposition framework for analyzing interpersonal perception and behavior in groups. When every member of a group rates (or behaves toward) every other member in a round-robin design, each rating reflects three distinct sources: the perceiver's general tendency to see others a certain way (actor effect), the target's general tendency to be seen that way by others (partner effect), and the unique adjustment a particular perceiver makes for a particular target (relationship effect), plus error. The SRM partitions the total variance into these components and estimates two kinds of reciprocity -- generalized (do people who like others tend to be liked?) and dyadic (do specific pairs uniquely reciprocate?). By separating the perceiver, the target, and their unique relationship, the SRM answers fundamental questions about whether interpersonal judgments lie in the eye of the beholder, the qualities of the person judged, or the chemistry of the dyad.