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部分ゲーム完全均衡×シュタッケルベルク競争×
分野ゲーム理論ゲーム理論
系統Machine learningMachine learning
提唱年19651934
提唱者Reinhard SeltenHeinrich von Stackelberg
種類algorithmalgorithm
原典Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗
別名Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form EquilibriumQuantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium
関連44
概要Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.
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ScholarGate手法を比較: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium · Stackelberg Competition. 2026-06-19に以下より取得 https://scholargate.app/ja/compare