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| シャープレイ値× | Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) メカニズム× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | ゲーム理論 | ゲーム理論 |
| 系統 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 提唱年≠ | 1953 | 1961 |
| 提唱者≠ | Lloyd Shapley | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| 種類 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 原典≠ | Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| 別名 | Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| 関連 | 4 | 4 |
| 概要≠ | The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
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