Free Will and Agency
Free will and agency concern whether and how we act for reasons and control our actions, especially if the world is deterministic.
Definition
Free will is the capacity of agents to control their actions in the sense required for moral responsibility; agency is the exercise of such control in acting for reasons, the central concern of the theory of action.
Scope
This topic covers the metaphysics of free will, compatibilism and incompatibilism, the consequence argument, hierarchical and reasons-responsive theories of control, and the causal theory of action. It addresses how mental states figure as reasons and causes of behavior.
Core questions
- Is free will compatible with the truth of determinism?
- What kind of control is required for moral responsibility?
- Are reasons for action a species of cause?
- Does the causal closure of the physical threaten genuine agency?
Key concepts
- compatibilism
- incompatibilism
- consequence argument
- reasons-responsiveness
- higher-order desire
- deviant causal chains
Key theories
- Hierarchical theory of freedom
- A will is free when an agent's first-order desires are governed by the higher-order desires they want to be effective, distinguishing persons from wantons.
- Causal theory of action
- Acting for a reason is having one's behavior caused, in the right way, by the relevant belief and desire that rationalize it.
History
Davidson (1963) revived the view that reasons are causes, grounding the causal theory of action. Frankfurt (1971) offered a hierarchical account of free will, van Inwagen (1983) defended incompatibilism via the consequence argument, and Fischer and Ravizza (1998) developed a reasons-responsive theory of moral responsibility.
Debates
- Compatibilism versus incompatibilism
- Whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism, with the consequence argument pressing the incompatibilist side.
- Reasons as causes
- Whether explaining an action by the agent's reasons is a form of causal explanation, and how to rule out deviant causal chains.
Key figures
- Harry Frankfurt
- Peter van Inwagen
- Donald Davidson
- John Martin Fischer
Related topics
Seminal works
- davidson1963
- frankfurt1971
- vaninwagen1983
- fischer1998
Frequently asked questions
- What is the consequence argument?
- It is van Inwagen's argument that if determinism is true, our actions are consequences of the past and the laws of nature, over which we have no control, so we lack free will.