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	Shapleyjeva vrijednost	Ravnoteža po Nashu
Područje	Teorija igara	Teorija igara
Obitelj	Machine learning	Machine learning
Godina nastanka	1953	1950
Tvorac	Lloyd Shapley	John Nash
Vrsta	algorithm	algorithm
Temeljni izvor	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Drugi nazivi	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Srodne	4	4
Sažetak	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.