Usporedite metode

	Evolucijska teorija igara	Ravnoteža po Nashu
Područje	Teorija igara	Teorija igara
Obitelj	Machine learning	Machine learning
Godina nastanka	1973	1950
Tvorac	John Maynard Smith, George Price	John Nash
Vrsta	algorithm	algorithm
Temeljni izvor	Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Drugi nazivi	ESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Srodne	4	4
Sažetak	Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.