Usporedite metode

	Counterfactual Analysis	Bargaining Model of War
Područje	International Relations	International Relations
Obitelj	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Godina nastanka	1991	1995
Tvorac	James Fearon (methodological treatment); Tetlock & Belkin (framework)	James D. Fearon
Vrsta	Method of causal reasoning via hypothetical alternatives	Formal model of war as bargaining failure
Temeljni izvor	Fearon, J. D. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics, 43(2), 169–195.	Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
Drugi nazivi	Counterfactual Reasoning in IR, What-If Analysis in International Relations, Counterfactual Thought Experiments, Hypothetical Case Analysis	Rationalist Explanations for War, Bargaining Theory of War, Crisis Bargaining Model, Fearon Bargaining Model
Srodne	3	3
Sažetak	Counterfactual analysis evaluates causal claims in international relations by reasoning about what would have happened had some antecedent been different: had the archduke not been assassinated, had the United States not deployed missiles, had a leader chosen otherwise. As Fearon (1991) argues, such counterfactuals play a necessary if often implicit role in testing hypotheses about singular and small-N events, where ordinary statistical comparison is impossible. Done rigorously — with plausible antecedents, sound connecting principles, and attention to confounders — counterfactual analysis disciplines the 'what if' reasoning that pervades historical and conflict explanation.	The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement.