Usporedite metode

	Accountability Mechanism Analysis	Principal-Agent Analysis in the Public Sector
Područje	Public Administration	Public Administration
Obitelj	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Godina nastanka	2007	1984
Tvorac	Mark Bovens	Terry M. Moe
Vrsta	Conceptual accountability assessment framework	Institutional-economics analysis
Temeljni izvor	Bovens, M. (2007). Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework. European Law Journal, 13(4), 447–468.	Moe, T. M. (1984). The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 739–777.
Drugi nazivi	Accountability Assessment Framework, Bovens Accountability Analysis, Public Accountability Mechanism Analysis	Public Principal-Agent Analysis, Agency Theory in Government, Political Control Delegation Analysis
Srodne	4	4
Sažetak	Accountability mechanism analysis provides a structured way to identify, describe and evaluate the relationships through which public actors must explain and justify their conduct to others. Mark Bovens, in his 2007 conceptual framework, defines accountability narrowly as a relationship in which an actor has an obligation to render an account of conduct to a forum that can pose questions, pass judgement, and impose consequences. The method first maps these relationships, then classifies them by the type of forum and obligation, and finally assesses them against political, constitutional and learning perspectives. Its purpose is to bring analytical precision to a concept that is otherwise used as a vague synonym for good governance.	Principal-agent analysis in the public sector applies agency theory to the chains of delegation that run through government — from voters to legislators, legislators to executives, and executives to bureaucracies. Terry Moe's 1984 article The New Economics of Organization brought this institutional-economics lens into the study of public bureaucracy, asking how political principals can control agents who have their own interests and superior information. The method identifies the principal and agent, specifies how their goals diverge, characterises the information asymmetry between them, and examines the control mechanisms principals use to limit agency losses. Its purpose is to explain bureaucratic behaviour and the design of oversight as the predictable result of delegation under conflicting incentives.