Government Formation Model
The government formation model is a non-cooperative bargaining theory explaining how a cabinet and the division of its portfolios emerge when no party holds a majority. In the canonical Baron-Ferejohn (1989) framework, a head of state or chance mechanism recognizes one party as formateur with a probability often proportional to its seat share; the formateur proposes a government and an allocation of the spoils of office, and the proposal takes effect only if a legislative majority accepts. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) embed this in an electoral and coalition setting. The model's signature result is a proposer (formateur) advantage: the party that gets to propose secures a disproportionate share of portfolios.
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यह खंड पढ़ने के लिए निःशुल्क खाते से साइन इन करें।
पद्धति मानचित्र
सम्बन्धित पद्धतियों का परिवेश — अन्वेषण हेतु किसी नोड का चयन करें।
स्रोत
- Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181-1206. DOI: 10.2307/1961664 ↗
- Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1988). Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82(2), 405-422. DOI: 10.2307/1957392 ↗
इस पृष्ठ का उद्धरण कैसे दें
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Government Formation and Portfolio Allocation Model. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/hi/political-economy/government-formation-model
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