Bargaining Model of War
The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement.
पूरी विधि पढ़ें
यह खंड पढ़ने के लिए निःशुल्क खाते से साइन इन करें।
पद्धति मानचित्र
सम्बन्धित पद्धतियों का परिवेश — अन्वेषण हेतु किसी नोड का चयन करें।
स्रोत
- Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300033324 ↗
इस पृष्ठ का उद्धरण कैसे दें
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Rationalist Bargaining Model of War (Fearon). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/hi/international-relations/bargaining-model-of-war
कौन-सी पद्धति?
इस पद्धति को उसकी निकटतम सजातीय पद्धतियों के साथ रखकर उन्हें साथ-साथ पढ़ें — पुस्तकालय पुस्तकें मेज़ पर रख देता है; चुनाव आपका है।
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