Comparer des méthodes

	Valeur de Shapley	Équilibre de Nash
Domaine	Théorie des jeux	Théorie des jeux
Famille	Machine learning	Machine learning
Année d'origine	1953	1950
Auteur d'origine	Lloyd Shapley	John Nash
Type	algorithm	algorithm
Source fondatrice	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Alias	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Apparentées	4	4
Résumé	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.